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Abstract: Automated border control (ABC) is concerned with fast and secure processing for intelligence-led identification. The 
FastPass project aims to build a harmonised, modular reference system for future European ABC. When biometrics is taken on 
board as identity, spoofing attacks become a concern. This paper presents current research in algorithm development for 
counter-spoofing attacks in biometrics. Focussing on three biometric traits, face, fingerprint, and iris, it examines possible types 
of spoofing attacks, and reviews existing algorithms reported in relevant academic papers in the area of countering measures to 
biometric spoofing attacks. It indicates that the new developing trend is fusion of multiple biometrics against spoofing attacks.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The FastPass project1 aims to build a harmonised modular reference system for all European automatic border 
crossing points. With growth in travellers and complexity of travel documents, it is desired to have fast and secure 
processing for intelligence-led border control. Biometrics, the identification of humans by their traits, is a key 
means used in automated border control (ABC). By automating identity checks, biometrics can confirm quickly and 
accurately that travellers are whom they claim to be. As early as in 2002, the US Congress had asked the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) to assess biometric technologies that can be used for US border control applications 
(News-1 2002). In Biometrics Review: 2008/09 (News-2 2009), it stated that biometrics at the border received a 
boost when the European Commission unveiled plans to strengthen Schengen zone border security, while 
facilitating travel for citizens, tourists and legal migrants. The recent survey conducted by Frost & Sullivan 
forecasted that the biometrics market in the global border control will expand steadily due to increasing 
international co-operation on travel security issues (News-3 2013).  
The commonly used biometric traits in ABC are face, fingerprint, and iris. A typical biometric ABC may work in 
such a way that a passport is read by a document reader followed by machine checking the face, fingerprint, 
or/and iris. Then, a positive checking result opens the gate; otherwise the gate remains closed. For example, the 
UK Border Agency uses face matching for all its operational e-gate systems, which are currently only open to EU 
citizens holding electronic machine readable travel document (e-MRTD). The UK Border Agency also collects 
fingerprint scans (10 flat fingerprints) from persons applying for UK visas and these can be matched on arrival2. It 
becomes crucial to increase the reliability of biometric systems. In some cases, a multimodal biometric system is 
in place to enforce the security of a machine identification system.  
However, machine intelligence is challenged by spoofing attacks. At the biometric sensor level, these attacks 
could be, for example of face, a printed face on a piece of paper, a face on an iPad screen, or a face mask (could 
be 3D) worn by an attacker. The vulnerabilities of algorithms used for biometric based identification need further 
exploration to mitigate potential attacks. Software based solutions are under research to find counter-spoofing 
mechanisms to optimise performance of biometric recognitions (Gomez-Barrero, Galbally, and Fierrez 2013). This 
paper overviews the current research in the area of anti-spoofing attacks in biometrics. It particularly focuses on 
recent algorithm developments based on literature review. The review is categorised by three different biometric 
traits (i.e. face, fingerprint, and iris). In the next section, the detailed reviews are presented with the three 
categories, followed by a conclusion in the final section. 
 
RESEARCH ON COUNTER-SPOOFING MECHANISMS IN BIOMETRICS: AN OVERVIEW 
Depending on sensors and recognition algorithms used in biometric systems, counter-spoofing algorithms can be 
attempted. Software solutions may take place to improve performance of biometric systems against spoofing 
attacks. Mechanisms have been sought by research, and relevant counter-spoofing algorithms are developed. In 
this section, seminal algorithms used for countering spoofing attacks for face, fingerprint, and iris are reviewed. 
                                                 
1 FastPass is a collaborative project funded by the European Commission under the 7th Framework Programme, with grant 
agreement no. 312583 (https://www.fastpass-project.eu/). 
2 Acknowledgement: The information is provided by Chris Hurrey from IntrePID Minds Ltd, UK, a FastPass project partner, closely 
working with the UK Border Agency.     
 
Counter-spoofing algorithms in face recognition 
A falsified face could be a printed photograph, a photograph displayed on a screen, and videos replayed on a 
screen. Techniques used in countering spoofing attacks for 2D face recognition can be broadly classified into three 
categories, i.e. motion, texture and liveness (Kahm and Damer 2012).  
 Motion analysis: the analysis is based on the fact that there is significant difference between motions of 
planar objects and real human faces (3D). Algorithms of spoofing detection based on motion analysis are 
usually associated with optical flow. The assumption is that different patterns of optical flow fields reveal 
the difference between movements of 3D face (real face) and 2D face (spoofing face). 
 Texture analysis: it is assumed that printed/LED faces contain outstanding texture patterns that do not exist 
in real faces. The other common observation is that images/videos with spoofing faces (printed or replayed) 
are usually noisier than those of real faces. In this case, noise variance may be used as a distinction feature 
for the detection. 
 Liveness detection: Life signs may include eye blinking, lips movements, etc. This requires analysis of local 
movement against global movement. Developed algorithms under this approach focus on the movement of a 
certain identified part of a face.  
Among the three categories, texture analysis dominants approaches to distinction of live and spoofing faces. In the 
recent competition on counter measures to 2D face spoofing attacks (Chingovska 2013), eight teams took part in 
the competition, and seven of them made use of image textures in their algorithms. These texture features 
include local binary code (LBP), gray-level co-occurrence matrix (GLCM), and Gabor features. LBP has shown its 
effectiveness as image features in face spoofing detection(Chingovska, Anjos, and Marcel 2012). Statistical 
features, such as first and second moments are also used as descriptors in the feature space. For motion analysis, 
optical flows are popularly adapted in algorithm development (Bao et al. 2009); and live signs are connected to 
both eye blinking and lip moving (Pan et al. 2007; Wang, Ding, and Fang 2009). With regards to classifiers, a 
variety of Support Vector Machines (SVMs) have seen their applications in face spoofing detection (Chingovska 
2013). 
Texture analysis has advantages of simple implementation, possible decision from a single frame, and no user 
collaboration needed. However it requires data covering all possible attacks, and may fail with low textural 
attacks. Algorithms based on motion and life sign detection are independent to textures and very hard to spoof by 
2D images, but it needs a video sequence, and may also need user-cooperation. The new developing trend of 2D 
face anti-spoofing algorithms is fusion of different categories of cues, either in the feature level (a single 
classifier) or in the score level (multiple classifiers). Such an approach is effective in tackling a diverse set of face 
spoofing attacks (Chingovska 2013).  
 
Counter-spoofing algorithms for fingerprint recognition 
The fingerprint is another biometric trait widely used in biometric border crossing systems. Two types scanning 
technology dominate commercial products: optical sensors and capacitive sensors. After capturing fingerprints, a 
scanner performs one-against-one or one-against-all matching with enrolled data. Fingerprint scanners are robust 
and achieve high accuracy for identification tasks, however, they are potentially vulnerable to spoofing attacks, 
which reproduce fake fingerprints from original copies (Galbally et al. 2011; Espinoza, Champod, and Margot 
2011). Common spoofing attacks use scanned finger images, artificial fingers, or cadaver fingers. The materials for 
making artificial fingers include silicone, latex, gelatin, play-doh, waxes, and wood glue (van der Putte and 
Keuning 2001; Matsumoto 2002). 
Counter-spoofing algorithms incorporate liveness detection, which can be implemented in two ways: hardware and 
software. The hardware solution detects liveness based on natural features such as odour, pulse, blood pressure, 
temperature and electrical resistance. The obvious limitation of these methods is the requirement for additional 
hardware, hence extra security measures for the hardware. Software-based solutions analyse the image data 
directly and do not require extra hardware. A common method for liveness detection is based on fingerprint 
perspiration patterns (Derakhshani et al. 2003; Parthasaradhi et al. 2005; Abhyankar and Schuchers 2009).  When 
touching the scanner’s surface, a real fingertip becomes wetter over time due to the perspiration process. 
Especially, the pattern of the ridges on a fingerprint becomes darker on a capacitive fingerprint sensor. This will 
not appear on an artificial finger or a photocopy of the fingerprint image. Thus, by measuring the variation of the 
perspiration patterns over time, for instance 2–5 seconds, liveness can be detected. This method may cause false 
alarms when people have a skin condition which is not suitable for the detection, or may require a different period 
of touching. 
It is reported that fake fingers will lose some details, such as pores, when they are fabricated from the materials 
listed above (Marcialis, Roli, and Tidu 2010). The size of the pores is less than 1 mm, so that they are very difficult 
to replicate on an artificial finger, i.e. real fingers have many more pores than artificial fingers. Therefore, 
counting the number of pores may be an approach to identify fake fingers. Skin distortion occurs during movement 
such as rotating the finger on the scanner surface, whereas fake fingers give less or different deformation. Signal 
analysis of fingerprint ridges and valleys has shown the difference between real and fake fingerprints (Tan and 
Schuckers 2010). Coli et al. (Coli, Marcialis, and Roli 2007) found that the frequency between ridges and valleys is 
altered during the fabrication process. They use power spectrum analysis based on the Fourier transform to detect 
fake fingers. Various image features have been attempted to distinguish live and fake fingerprint images. Again, 
LBP has shown promising results among all the features (Nikam and Agarwal 2008a; Ojala, Pietikainen, and 
Maenpaa 2002). More recently, Ghiani et al. (Ghiani, Marcialis, and Roli 2012) proposed the Local Phase 
Quantization (LPQ) feature, which shows competitive performance. Fusion of multiple image features is popularly 
used in practice (Pereira et al. 2012; Nikam and Agarwal 2008b). It has been demonstrated to improve the 
performance of fingerprint spoofing detection. 
 
Counter-spoofing algorithms for iris recognition  
Iris patterns are epigenetic and possess a high degree of randomness (Daugman 2003). Like face identification, Iris 
identification is non-intrusive. This makes iris and face more suitable to be integrated in a future FastPass system. 
However, to capture high quality iris images from a long-distance moving target is currently still a challenging 
task. On the other hand, compared with face, iris provides a higher degree of uniqueness, and unlike face, iris is 
believed to be stable over a person’s lifetime. 
Similar to face and fingerprint, iris systems can be deceived using cheap spoofing methods, such as printed iris 
images, cosmetic contact lenses with a printed iris pattern, artificial eyes and handheld displays. Previous 
research has evaluated the vulnerability to such spoofing attacks and the importance of applying counter-spoofing 
mechanisms (Ruiz-Albacete et al. 2008; Galbally et al. 2012). 
Daugman (Daugman 2003) proposed theories that using optical properties from different parts of an eye (blood, 
melanin pigment, tissue and fat), retina reflection (the red eye effect) and purkinje reflection. High quality 
cameras are required for capturing these features. Chen et al. (Chen, Lin, and Ding 2012) proposed an approach 
based on texture changes of the conjunctival blood vessel and iris patterns from multispectral images. They 
claimed that with a real iris texture varies with light frequency, whereas with a fake one it stays constant. Image 
texture analysis has also been popular in academic research. A simple method is to analyse high-frequency 
spectral magnitude based on Fourier transform (Daugman 2003). The method recognizes spurious coherence from 
printed iris patterns. However, this method would fail for partially blurred printed iris patterns or high-resolution 
printed patterns (He, Lu, and Shi 2009). Rather than using optical or texture features alone, Lee and Son (Lee and 
Son 2012) recently combined both optical and texture features in iris anti-spoofing detection. Galbally et al. 
(Galbally et al. 2012) proposed a liveness detection system based on a set of image quality related features. More 
recently, Connel et al. (Connel et al. 2013) proposed an approach to detect cosmetic contact lenses by projecting 
additional structured light patterns onto the eye. They found that without a contact lens, the reflected patterns 
have straight lines, whereas with a contact lens, the patterns had curved lines. Eye movement has also been used 
as a basis for spoofing countermeasures. Movement includes eye hippus, constriction and dilation of the pupil and 
iris, and eyelid blinks, which can all be captured by a normal camera. Bodade et al. (Bodade, Talbar, and Batnagar 
2009; Bodade and Talbar 2011) calculated variations of pupil dilation from multiple iris images and recent research 
uses pupil constriction in iris liveness detection (Huang et al. 2013). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
Biometrics have shown its practice in ABC, and will be continously used in the future ABC. Counter-spoofing 
attacks in biometrics have to be considered. An ideal ABC may have a nature of non-intrusive, efficiency, and 
effectiveness. These require advanced algorithms to identify/verify submitted biometric traits in such a way that 
both accuracy and computational cost are taken into account. In this paper, as one of the objectives in the 
FastPass project, we present an overview of current research of counter-spoofing mechanisms in biometrics. 
Algorithms and features used in these algorithms are broadly discussed. Their pros and cons are briefly summarised 
for reference. It has been noted that the new developing trend of counter-spoofing algorithms is data fusion at 
different levels, such as, feature level fusion, decision level fusion, and fusion of multiple traits. 
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